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BOOK REVIEWS

Religious Reading: The Place of Reading in the Practice of Religion by Paul J.
Griffiths. Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. xii + 210. Cloth $39.95.
PAUL REASONER, Bethel College
Paul Griffiths argues for the recovery of a particular type of reading, religious reading, which has as its purpose learning to give a religious account
of the world. Religious reading assumes and develops a particular relationship between the reader and the world (e.g., [for Christians] "the world is
to be interpreted in terms of the Bible, written into its margins, so to speak,
rather than the other way around" (19, my emphasis)). Griffiths claims religious reading has all but died out and consumerist reading is the dominant
type of reading in the academic world today, where consumerist reading is
understood as focusing on "the metaphors of production, consumption,
use, and control" (42). Memory is central to religious reading, and Griffiths
offers both moral and practical arguments for the necessity of memory in
religious reading. The latter part of the book takes up the genres of religious reading and examines at length commentary and anthology with
extended discussions of their importance in Buddhist India and Roman
Africa. While the preceding gives roughly the themes of the book, it fails to
capture the passion of the text. The book is a serious defense of religious
reading, a harsh attack against consumerist reading, and a passionate call
for more converts to religious reading. After a few general comments, I
will focus on memory, the distinction between religious and consumerist
reading, and the role of specialists in religious reading.
Everyone should find something of interest here. Topics include: the
physical properties of writing and manuscript construction in India (Ch. 5)
and in Roman Africa (Ch. 6); mnemotechnical devices (memory techniques); descriptions of Buddhist monastic life in India by Chinese
Buddhist pilgrims; and a discussion of commonplace books in Europe with
special attention to John Locke's prescription for constructing the index for
such a book. Lovers of language will find themselves scurrying to the notes
for further references.
Griffiths' prose has a bracing freshness and vigor. For example, he introduces the reader to a theory in the first half of a sentence ("Olsen ... has
recently claimed that systematic thought about the structure of a language
has the existence and use of writing among its preconditions, ... "), only to
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refute the theory in the second half of the same sentence by means of a brilliantly decisive counter-exarnple (" ... a claim falsified at once by the example
of Panini, the Indian grammarian, who thought deeply and systematically
about the structure of the Sanskrit language, but who did so without using
writing and possibly even without knowing of its existence" (31)). Here and
there powerfully phrased thoughts beg to be written down into one's commonplace book for later use (at least until reading Chapter 4 when the practice is roundly condemned!}---e.g., "Bilingualism is possible, but bireligionism is not" (12). Savor this selection from a discussion of the catechumal
stage of those joining the early Christian church: "The oral instruction was
intended to provide a resonant manifold [echoing George Steiner's phrase]
of memorized words, to textualize the catechumens, and by so doing transform them into people who, as a result of becoming textualized-having the
blood in their veins replaced, corpuscle by corpuscle, with the words of
Scripture-will act in accord with what these words prescribe" (162).
But readers should be warned that few will corne out unscathed from biting criticisms. Griffiths is harsh on scholars in biblical studies, religious studies, anthropology, Indology, and philosophy. Concerning religious studies,
he writes, "One [irony], most pressing for scholars of religion, is that the very
intellectual activity that makes possible and largely constitutes the study of
religion in universities also makes it effectively impossible to understand
what is studied" (182). Or, consider another instance of Griffiths at his
polemical best: "Indologists and anthropologists have done more to destroy
traditional Sanskrit learning than ever Christian missionaries could" (185).
He also has a sweeping indictment of the university: "University scholars,
therefore, in their role as creatures of global consumerism, have made major
contributions to the eradication of religious reading as an intellectual or cultural force of significance" (185). Griffiths argues that the university based
study of religion is squarely in the consumerist mode.
The contrast between the consumerist reader and the religious reader is
sharply illustrated by what each reader does with a text: "The response of a
consumerist reader to a work like this [Nagarjuna's Sutrasamuccaya
(Anthology of Sacred Works)] is to make a critical edition of it; that of the
religious reader is to learn it by heart" (132). Griffiths condemns consumerist reading in part because he believes the strong claim that religious
texts in the end can only be understood by religious readers.
Pride of place in the practice of religious reading is given to memory.
Indeed, Griffiths takes great pains (and rightly so given our culture of literacy) to show that writing and literacy are not necessary for composition, display, and storage ("learning a work, was a matter of ears, memory, and
mouth" (147)). Memory is so important in the ideal version of religious reading that Griffiths can summarize this point by saying, "Religious readers,
paradoxically, need not know how to read" (40). Memory, then, and not
written records, is the preferred method of storage. In both sustained arguments and scattered comments on the topic of memory throughout the book,
Griffiths offers reasons for the necessity of memory in religious reading.
Memory is the preferred method of storage because: (1) there may be technological difficulty in storing texts on written records (in some times and
places); (2) creating written records is expensive (in some times and places);
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(3) memory allows for more instant access to any part of the text (even when
compared with the current technological search methods); (4) memorizing is
hard, and what takes more effort is preferred morally from a religious perspective; (5) memorized text will (or has the capacity to) change the life, character, and very being of the one in whose memory the text is stored.
Some of these reasons (e.g., (1) technological difficulty of storage, or (2)
expense) are clearly only decisive in particular historical/ cultural contexts.
However, Griffiths tries to justify the dependence on memory on practical
grounds even when technological and economic difficulties are not present. He claims that retrieval from memory is faster than searches in storage devices such as books or electronic media (see (3) above). These comparisons seem forced. However, claims (1) through (3) are not critical. The
heart of the matter for religious reading lies in the moral claims about (4)
effort and (5) personal transformation.
While it takes effort to memorize a text, it also costs something to have a
text copied or to copy it oneself. Each of these instances is thought to display one's spiritual intentions, and, in some religious traditions, lead to the
accrual of merit. Memory does seem to be one marker of spiritual intention, but it is not the only such marker.
The strongest argument in moral terms for the superiority of memory
over other storage devices is that memorized religious texts work internally to change the person. Religious traditions are replete with examples of
such positive changes, so I accept this judgment about memory. But to
nuance the claim, consider two points.
First, memory is not a sufficient condition for such character transformation. Memory is possible without depth of understanding. But Griffiths is
surely correct when he follows Hugh of St. Victor's lead (Didascalicon)
where memory is considered to be necessary for the rumination out of
which deep understanding comes.
Second, unlike his writings elsewhere, Griffiths deliberately avoids talk
of the truth of religious accounts ("There is always the question of truth; is
one, none, or several of the religious accounts offered true? But this is not
my interest here" (14». To be sure, Griffiths does include content in his
analysis of religious reading (see in particular his discussion of anthology
and commentary). Griffiths assumes throughout that the internal change
caused by religious reading is a good thing. Can religious reading be
defended as a good aside from consideration of the content and truth
claims of the various religious accounts?
Depending upon the religious account inculcated, one "sees" the world
and its people and aspects differently. Since these accounts do differ on
valuations and meaning given to disparate aspects of life and world, the
religious reader will be shaped differently depending upon the particular
tradition followed. The personal transformations may be in conflict across
religious accounts (e.g., a particular group of people might be honored in
one account, and castigated by another). So, it seems that the truth claims
cannot be set aside after all, unless one is willing to argue that religious
reading in general is a good because it produces some good (not specific to
a particular religious account) in the religious reader, where that good is
then specified, e.g., moving away from self-centeredness to other-centered-
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ness (Hick). Griffiths does not offer such an argument here. Rather, he
argues with passion for the conclusion that consumerist reading (particularly of religious texts) is evil. The implication is that since consumerist
reading is evil, religious reading must be good.
Memory also seems to serve for Griffiths as one criterion of distinction
between religious reading and consumerist reading. He is convincing in
his demonstration of the centrality of memory in religious reading. But one
could argue that memory is a crucial ability for consumerist readers as well
as for religious readers. Good university scholars are famous for their
memories. They remember reading in a particular journal article precisely
this or that objection or reply; how to access certain technologically
advanced research tools; that there is a coffee stain on the page before the
one where the passage they are looking for appears; and they have memorized passages in key texts in their specialties. While memory alone may
not be sufficient to distinguish between religious and consumerist reading,
what is done with memory in the two types of reading is distinguished
sharply by what the reader expects from the text. In consumerist reading,
the reader uses the text for personal creative purposes. In religious reading,
the reader submits to the text and understands the text to be "a stable and
vastly rich resource" such that there is "no final act of reading" (41).
Griffiths recognizes that not all persons will be religious readers to the
same extent. Indeed, he identifies an inner core of virtuosi readers-specialists-who (1) provide a model of what it means to be a religious reader, (2) maintain the purity of the tradition, and (3) determine how the tradition should interact with texts from outside the tradition (here canon
and index are mentioned with approval (64-65». Specialist readers, as a
category, are easily understood as those in the religious tradition most
highly regarded for memory ability, depth of understanding, and interpretive ability based on the memorized texts. Those less advanced in a
religious tradition aspire to becoming specialist readers; or, alternatively,
if life commitments yield less time for the practice of religious reading
they often financially support specialist readers and approve of their place
in the religious tradition. Specialist readers have mastered the canon and
assist others in their study of the canon.
However, when Griffiths includes in the specialist reader the role of
arbiter of the tradition with the world outside the tradition, e.g., politically
or with the establishment and protection of the canon and the designation
of proscribed works (index), the nature of the reading of specialist readers
begins to blur. Someone within the tradition must have ascertained (by
reading, presumably) which works are on the index. This type of reading
would seem to be in the consumerist mode by Griffiths' categorization.
Furthermore, the very nature of the reading-wide-ranging, topical, once
through-necessary for keeping an index seems antithetical to the ideal of
religious reading-focused, slow, committing works to memory, ruminatory. Yet, at least some specialist readers seem to be required to have both
traits. This suggests several threads to untangle. On the one hand, religious
reading is marked by the kind of reading-focused on traditional texts,
slow, committing works to memory, ruminatory. On the other hand, religious reading could also be characterized by the purpose of the reading-to
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make sense of oneself and the world in terms of the religious account and
to continually be working out that account more fully. In this latter characterization, some of what appears to be consumerist reading must surely be
going on, i.e., consumerist reading in terms of the kind of reading-quick,
cursory, not committing to memory. But it is not consumerist reading in
terms of the second thread, the purpose of the reading. For consumerist
reading is self-absorptive, focused on creative production for its own sake,
whereas religious reading is fundamentally reading aimed at providing a
better and deeper religious account of the world.
The questions I have raised about the role of memory and the nature of
virtuosi readers are only intended to rein in some of Griffiths' analyses
where the distinctions are drawn perhaps too starkly. His fundamental
point about the loss of religious reading and its importance in learning and
living a religious account of the world is surely right. It has implications for
the future of universities and religious institutions of learning and worship. It also has personal implications: one should start memorizing,
choose more carefully what to read, and be more intentional about the task
of giving a religious account. Griffiths seeks to convert readers to the practice of religious reading. I have been so converted.

Characters in Search of Their Author: The Gifford Lectures, Glasgow 1999-2000
by Ralph McInerny. University of Notre Dame Press, 2001, 132pp. $25.00.
LAURA GARCIA, Boston College
In these lectures, presented in Glasgow in October and November of 1999
and February of 2000, Professor McInerny spins a fascinating tale of the
history of philosophy since Descartes that reads like a novel. Though he
finds most of the major modern figures wanting with respect to their philosophical views, they emerge from these pages as living, three-dimensional
persons, so vividly portrayed that one's previous encounters with them
seem to have taken place in a kind of philosophical flatland. We follow
Descartes from his famous dream as a young soldier to his death in
Stockholm in the presence of his priest and confessor. Looking back to a
medieval thinker, we pause beside Anselm of Canterbury in "the first stall
on the left in the monastery at Bec in Normandy," chanting Psalm 41: "The
fool has said in his heart there is no God."
The burden of these early lectures is to show that the trajectory of philosophy tends toward today's widespread intellectual nihilism, a philosophical attitude that McInerny calls "radical chic." The remainder of Part
I of the book begins a ground-clearing operation for the project of nahlral
theology, itself taken up more explicitly in Part II. Nihilism or anti-realism
confronts Aristotle's defense of the first principle of reason, the law of noncontradiction. Following St. Thomas (just a coincidence?) McInerny argues
that logical and psychological versions of this principle depend on its ontological formulation: "It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the
same time and in the same respect" (p. 48). The connection between

